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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS 
APPEAL, STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW, 
AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
1. Did the trial court err in ruling, as a matter of law, 
that attorney's fees are not recoverable as consequential 
damages in a wrongful termination action? 
Standard of Review: correctness of the court's ruling. See 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). 
2. Did the trial court err in dismissing Heslop's 
contractual public policy claim at the close of Heslop's case in 
chief? 
Standard of Review;-No substantial evidence to support the 
claim. Brehany v. Nordstroms, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Casef Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
in the Trial Court 
The trial court ruled, as a matter of law that Heslopfs 
attorney1s fees were not consequential damages. (Tr. 1565) 
During the hearing on the Bank of Utahfs (hereinafter 
"Bank") Motion for JNOV or, in the Alternative, for New Trial, 
the trial court rejected Heslop's argument that the Bank failed 
to object to the court's refusal to instruct the jury to 
disregard the accrual and related evidence once the public 
policy claim was dismissed. The issue is properly before the 
Court. (Supplemental Transcript on Appeal, hereinafter Supp. 
Tr., 28-29, attached hereto as Addendum 1) 
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in his order denying the Bankfs Motion for JNOV/New Trial, 
Judge Roth specifically removed language from the order that the 
verdict of constructive discharge was supported by "substantial" 
evidence. The order simply states there was evidence to support 
this finding. (R. 1184) 
B. Additional Statement of Facts 
After the Bank was reorganized in January, 1983, company 
cars were taken away from all officers, not just Heslop. 
(Tr. 1060-61) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The jury's verdict must be supported by substantial 
evidence. Only admissible and competent evidence counts as 
substantial. The verdict of constructive discharge was not 
supported by substantial evidence because it was based on 
Heslop1s self-interested, implausible testimony and on 
inadmissible and prejudicial evidence. The verdict of implied-
in-fact contract was not supported by substantial evidence 
because it was based on oral representations and/or course of 
conduct which was not admissible in the face of an unambiguous 
employee handbook containing no provisions for termination only 
for cause. Heslop1s employment application unambiguously stated 
he was an employee at will. Absent fraud or imposition he is 
estopped to deny it. The jury verdict finding no good cause to 
terminate was not supported by substantial evidence where Heslop 
lied to the bank about the Gabbert loan. 
00787 2 
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2. In the alternative to ordering judgment in favor of the 
bank, the court should order a new trial due to the 
insufficiency of the evidence and the admission of prejudicial 
evidence. 
3. Heslop's own testimony that he had an employment 
contract until age 65 terminable only for cause is barred by 
U.C.A. § 25-5-4(1) because "by its terms [it] is not to be 
performed within one year". 
4. Attorney1s fees should not be awarded as consequential 
damages in an implied-in-fact contract case. Where the contract 
is implied only, the parties would not have reasonably foreseen 
attorney1s fees as a consequential damage item. No Utah 
employment cases have held attorney's fees are recoverable in 
this context. 
5. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on 
Heslop's claimed breach of implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing because Utah does not recognize such a claim in the 
context of this wrongful termination case. Brehany v. 
Nordstroms, Inc., infra. 
6. Heslop's tort public policy claim was properly dismissed 
on summary judgment because Utah does not recognize such a 
claim. Furthermore, the court properly granted the Bank's 
motion to dismiss the contract public policy claim at the end of 
Heslop's evidence because there was no causal connection between 
the alleged public policy violations and Heslop's resignation 
from the bank. Browning's refusal to accept Heslop's offer of 
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resignation in January 1983 cut off any causal connection 
between his termination and the alleged violation of the call 
report statute prior to January of 1983. Heslopfs failure to 
report illegal conduct to regulatory authorities bars his public 
policy claim. There is no evidence Heslop was terminated 
because he refused to perform a requested illegal act, which 
bars the public policy claim. The evidence of a public policy 
violation is the same, whether it is considered a tort or a 
contract claim. Therefore, summary judgment on the tort public 
policy claim can be affirmed based on the absence of any 
substantial evidence to support the contract public policy 
claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE JURYfS VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL, RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. 
A. The Bank Is Not Required to Marshal Inadmissible Evidence 
Heslop argues the Bank failed to properly marshal the 
evidence. Heslop1s criticism is unfounded. A jury verdict can 
only be sustained upon "believable and admissible evidence," 
Durfey v. Board of Ed. of Wayne Cty., Etc., 604 P.2d 480 (Utah 
1979) (emphasis added); In Re Estate of Hubbard, 30 Utah 2d 260, 
516 P.2d 741 (1973). Therefore, any failure to marshal 
inadmissible evidence cannot be a basis for affirming the jury 
verdict. Nonetheless, the Bank did marshal evidence which 
Heslop claims supports the juryfs verdict (including 
0 0 7 8 7 4 
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inadmissible evidence) in great detail, including, inter alia: 
Bank's policy to terminate only for cause (Bank's Initial Brief, 
hereinafter Br., 7, 9); Heslop's employment history (Br. 9-10); 
accrual account problems, including wash entries and Heslop's 
favoring a one-time resolution to the problem (Br. 10-16, 24); 
Attorney General' s investigation (Br. 16-18); hiring of Timmons, 
his salary, and payments to Peat, Marwick (Br. 18-21, 36-37); 
Heslop's claim he was demoted (Br. 23); Heslop's testimony West 
told him to commit the Gabbert loan before an appraisal (Br. 
27); Heslop's testimony Kleyn demanded Heslop's written 
resignation (Br. 33)T Beutler's resignation and termination of 
Carlsen (Br. 38). 
B. The Jury's Verdict Must Be Supported By Substantial 
Relevant Evidence 
This Court will reverse a jury verdict where it is not 
supported by substantial evidence. Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P. 2d 414, 417 (Utah 1989) The verdict must be 
supported by substantial competent evidence.1" :Ed. at 418. 
Accord, Cambelt Intern. Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 
1987) . ("We will not overturn that verdict when it is supported 
by substantial and competent evidence.") 
In Utah State Road Comm'n v. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1975), the Supreme Court held there was no substantial 
evidence to support a $75,000 severance damage verdict and 
defined substantial as follows: 
. . . the modifying adjective "substantial" has 
been used advisedly to indicate a higher degree 
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of proof than just any evidence of any kind. 
The requirement is that the evidence must be 
sufficient in amount and credibility that, when 
considered in connection with the other 
evidence and circumstances shown in the case, 
would justify some, but not necessarily all, 
reasonable minds acting fairly thereon, to 
believe it to be the truth. And conversely, if 
when so considered, the court is convinced that 
it is so inconsequential, or so clearly lacking 
in credibility, that no jury acting fairly and 
reasonably could so believe, it cannot properly 
be regarded as substantial evidence. 
533 P.2d at 890 (emphasis added). The Court concluded the 
evidence was insufficient because the owner1s testimony "may 
well have been suffused with a high degree of self-interest." 
533 P.2d at 891. 
"When testimony of witnesses is in conflict, we accept that 
testimony which supports the jury's verdict, unless it is 
inherently implausible . . . ." Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 
811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). 
In determining whether there is substantial evidence to 
support the verdict in the instant case, the Court is entitled 
to consider sufficiency of the evidence in amount and 
credibility, self-interest of plaintiff's own testimony, and 
implausibility of testimony. 
1. The Jury's Verdict That Hesiop was Constructively 
Discharged Does Not Meet the Substantial Evidence 
Standard. 
(a) Self-Interested, Implausible, and Uncorroborated 
Testimony. 
Heslop's claim of constructive discharge was built upon his 
own, self-interested testimony, which was in conflict with the 
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testimony of other witnesses. Specifically, Heslopfs testimony 
regarding the $50,000 condition for closing the Gabbert loan was 
directly contradicted by West who testified the loan should not 
have been closed and the money disbursed unless the $50,000 
condition was met (Tr. 557-58) which it was not. (Tr. 558, 
1079-80, 1278-79, 1389) 
Next, Heslopfs testimony that Kleyn, upon orders from 
Timmons, demanded his written resignation, was contradicted by 
all other witnesses (West, Kleyn, and Timmons) who testified 
regarding that issue. (Tr. 569-70, 775-76, 788-89, 1286) 
Kleyn, West, and Timmons had not been employed by the Bank 
for several years when the case was tried. (Tr. 502, 756-57, 
777-78, 1221-22) None of them had self-interest to protect by 
testifying as they did regarding the resignation issue. 
Heslop's testimony was clearly self-interested, as is shown by 
the great significance he places on his assertion that Timmons 
demanded his resignation. (See Heslop's Brief at 38, 42, 46, 
59) Heslop's testimony is incredible and implausible on the 
resignation issue. 
Further, there was no evidence except Heslop's that he had 
no reasonable alternative to resigning after his lending 
authority was revoked. Kleyn and West both testified Heslop 
could have continued to work as a lending officer. (Tr. 569, 
791) Whether an employerfs act constitutes a constructive 
discharge is not determined by the employee's subjective 
reaction to it. Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979). 
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Significantly, even the trial judge, after having heard all 
the evidence, was not convinced there was "substantial" evidence 
to support the jury's verdict on the constructive discharge 
claim. (R. 1184) Thus, it was error to deny the Bank's motion 
for JNOV. 
(b) Browning's Refusal To Accept Heslop1s Resignation 
In January 1983. 
Browning's refusal, in January 1983, to accept Heslop1s 
offer to resign undercuts the argument that evidence of the 
accrual account and pre-1983 related events is relevant. 
Heslop downplays Browning's refusal, citing Browning's testimony 
that he wanted to avoid turnover of key personnel. This 
testimony, however, does not support Heslop's claim that he was 
put in a dead-end position to force him to resign. Conversely, 
it is perfectly consistent with the Bank's position that Heslop 
was made agricultural loan specialist because he could best 
serve the Bank in that position and not as punishment for prior 
acts. 
(c) Heslop Was Not Singled Out For A Pattern of 
Mistreatment 
Cases cited by Heslop supporting his claim of constructive 
discharge are distinguishable. In Real v. Continental Group, 
Inc. , 627 F.Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal. 1986), the evidence showed Real 
was passed over for a promotion because of his age; was demoted 
to a new position which was subsequently eliminated; was offered 
a new position but denied relocation benefits which were 
typically granted to others; was denied a request for a 
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different position; and was ultimately offered a new job which 
involved a nine grade demotion. The court found Real "was 
subjected to a continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment.11 
The court distinguished Realfs claim from Frazer v. KFC 
National Management Co., 491 F.Supp. 1099 (N.D. Ga. 1980), in 
which there was no constructive discharge where plaintiff quit 
rather than be demoted even though his salary and benefits 
stayed the same. Frazer is more analogous to Heslop1s case than 
Real. Real involved several instances of discriminatory conduct 
directed specifically at plaintiff. The same cannot be said of 
Heslop. 
Heslop also argues, relying on Spulak v. K-Mart Corp., 894 
F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990) that he was constructively discharged 
because the Bank's actions were unduly harsh to him as opposed 
to co-workers. He asserts he was placed in a dead-end position 
and told he could make no agricultural loans. (Heslop Brief at 
42) Heslop conveniently fails to cite his own testimony that 
even after reorganization, he could still make commercial loans 
(Tr. 376) and did make new agricultural loans to existing 
customers. (Tr. 374) 
The agricultural lending policy was Bank-wide, clearly not 
directed solely at Heslop. The Bank had problems in 1981-82, 
and sweeping changes were made to address them, all of which 
were approved by the entire Board. (Exh. 77D, 78D) It is 
implausible to suggest the Bank would approve both a 
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reorganization and a new loan policy with the object of singling 
out Heslop. No employee is that important. 
Even revocation of lending authority was not exclusively 
aimed at Heslop. (Tr. 568-69, 637-38, 1057, 1091, 1249, 1283-
84; Exh. 16-P) Total revocation of Heslop1s independent lending 
authority was a single incident, and not sufficient to establish 
a constructive discharge. 
(d) Heslop Was Not Given An Ultimatum Or Condition For 
Continued Employment. 
Zilmer v. Carnation Co., 263 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. App. 
1989), does not support Heslop1s claim of constructive 
discharge. Zilmer was told that obtaining a certified 
management accountant certificate was a pre-condition to his 
continued employment, without exception. After Zilmer1s 
termination, this requirement was not enforced by the company. 
No such condition was put on Heslopfs continued employment. 
In Spulak, supra, plaintiff "was given an ultimatum either 
to retire or be fired." Id. at 1154. This did not happen with 
Heslop, but again shows the significance of his claim he was 
told to resign by Kleyn. 
Price v. Boulder Valley School D.R.-2, 782 P.2d 821 (Colo. 
App. 1989) is dissimilar from the instant case. Price was a 
school teacher diagnosed as manic-depressive who suffered an 
emotional breakdown. His principal prepared a letter of 
resignation for Price and presented it to him for signature on 
several occasions. Price ultimately signed the resignation 
00787 10 
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letter. This is clearly different from the factual situation in 
Heslop*s case. 
(e) There Was No Pattern Of Termination Of Long-Term 
Employees. 
There are significant inconsistencies in Heslop1s 
interpretation of the alleged relevant evidence. Heslop argues 
terminations of other employees were relevant to show a pattern 
of placing long-term employees in dead-end positions so they 
would quit. This so-called pattern involved only two employees 
(West and Peacock), both of whose positions were changed and who 
left the Bank after Heslop resigned. (Heslop's Brief at 29-30) 
Carlsenfs termination the same month as Heslop resigned does not 
fit the pattern because he was expressly fired. The two major 
reductions of force in 1983, do not follow the pattern. 
Furthermore, West and Kleyn, both long-term employees (Exh. 57D, 
64D) were not put in dead-end positions when the Bank 
reorganized. West was made senior lending officer. (Exh. 78D) 
The evidence of other employees' terminations does not meet 
the admissibility standard of Rule 406, U. R. E. on evidence of 
routine practice. Heslop relies on Spulak, supra, to support 
the admissibility of this evidence. However, Spulak was an age 
discrimination claim where such evidence was "relevant to the 
issue of the employer's discriminatory intent." 894 F.2d at 
1156 (emphasis added). Heslop asserts no such issue in the 
instant case. 
00787 11 
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Heslop1 s pattern theory is irreconcilable with his testimony 
that Timmons told Kleyn to demand Heslop's resignation. If 
Timmons could not fire Heslop and instead put him in a dead-end 
position so he would quit, how could he demand resignation? 
Heslop cannot have it both ways. 
Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 
1990), is distinguishable. It involved testimony of prior 
accidents at the same location plaintiff fell as well as prior 
notice of a defect. In the instant case, the other terminations 
occurred after Heslop left the Bank. Finally, the evidence was 
not relevant to show the former employees' bias. Heslop did not 
intend to discredit his own witnesses by showing their bias, and 
the Bank objected to the testimony in the first place. 
(f) Cases Cited By The Bank Are Persuasive. 
Although Heslop did not have an express written agreement 
for a specific period of time, his assertion throughout the case 
that he had an employment contract terminable only for cause, 
and that the Bank had no cause to terminate, makes his 
resignation just as voluntary as the resignations which occurred 
in Knee and Christi. (Br. 52, 54-55) 
(g) Prejudicial Evidence Was Improperly Admitted. 
Heslop's position that evidence of wash entries, the 
investigation of the Bank, and the audit by Peat, Marwick was 
relevant to show the correctness of Heslop's position on 
resolving the accrual problem (Heslop Brief at 54) is 
superfluous. The Bank never claimed Heslop1s position was not 
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correct. Yet this evidence was extremely prejudicial because it 
tended to show the Bank was engaged in criminal conduct. 
Heslop argues evidence of Timmons1 salary and the payments 
to Peat, Marwick was relevant to counter the Bank's claim it was 
contracting rather than expanding in 1983. Any limited 
probative value the evidence had on that issue was clearly 
outweighed by the substantial prejudice of the evidence. Heslop 
used speculative innuendo that the payments to Peat, Marwick 
showed a strategy to use Timmons to intercede with the Attorney 
Generalfs investigation so that Browning rewarded him with the 
president's job, a large salary, and inordinate power sufficient 
to discharge employees. (Heslop Brief at 55) 
Heslop understandably provided no citation to the record for 
this theory because there was no such evidence. Moreover, the 
theory is contradictory. Timmons was supposedly given 
inordinate power to wrongfully discharge employees, yet 
conversely, he did not have authority to expressly fire Heslop. 
Once the irrelevant and prejudicial evidence is eliminated, 
that which remains (reorganization and revocation of lending 
authority) does not meet the substantial evidence requirement 
for affirmance of the constructive discharge verdict. 
2. No Substantial Evidence to Support Verdict of an 
implied-in-Fact Contract Terminable only For Good Cause 
The Supreme Court addressed the implied-in-fact contract 
exception in Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 
1991). It stated that evidence of "the employer's course of 
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conduct, and pertinent oral representations" is relevant to 
determine if an employment manual creates an implied-in-fact 
contract, but only where the language of the manual is 
ambiguous. "Thus, when it is plain that a manual or bulletin 
does not limit the right to discharge at will, the case need not 
go to a jury." 161 U.A.R. at 11. 
The Bank's employment handbook (Exh. 27P) did not contain 
any provision providing for termination only for cause. Thus, 
Brehany suggests evidence of course of conduct and oral 
representations are not relevant. Heslop bases his implied-in-
fact contract claim almost exclusively on course of conduct 
and/or oral representations. 
Heslop argues his employment application was not a contract 
and relies on McLain v. Great American Ins. Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 
863 (Cal. App. 1989), where the court allowed parol evidence 
because the application was not an integrated contract, but also 
because it found the at-will language in the application was 
ambiguous. No such ambiguity exists in Heslop1s application, in 
which he expressly "agree[d] that any employment . . . will 
depend upon my usefulness to the Bank, in its sole discretion; 
the Bank reserving the right to release me without notice, its 
obligation ending with the payment of salary through the last 
day I work." (Exh. IP) 
In Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal.Rptr. 185 (Cal. 
App. 1989), another case relied on by Heslop, the employee did 
not sign an at-will application or agreement. In fact, the 
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court distinguished Wilkerson from an earlier California case, 
Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (Cal. 
App. 1984), which held a stock option agreement signed by the 
employee, "which expressly defined the employment relationship 
as being at-will" could not be overridden by an implied 
contract. Shapiro, similar to Berube, stated "f[t]here cannot 
be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each 
embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.1" 
Wilkerson (quoting Shapiro), 261 Cal. Rptr. at 190. 
Even if Heslop's rehire is considered new employment, the 
evidence was undisputed that the prior employment application 
was revived. (Tr. 884-85, 1016-17) Heslop's employment 
application containing the at-will agreement remained a part of 
his personnel file during the entire time he was employed. 
"'The general rule is that when a person with the capacity of 
reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he is, in the 
absence of fraud and imposition, bound by its contents, and is 
estopped from saying that its explicit provisions are contrary 
to his intentions and understanding . . . . f " Anderson v. Savin 
Corp., 254 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Cal. App. 1988) 
3. No Substantial Evidence Supported the Jury's Verdict 
That the Bank Did Not Have Good Cause 
The Bank's position has always been it did not fire Heslop. 
The real question was whether there was good cause to revoke 
Heslop1s lending authority. Heslop's Brief is conspicuously 
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silent regarding his misrepresentation that Gabbert invested 
$50,000 into the dairy project. 
Heslop compounded the Gabbert loan's inherent problems by 
misrepresenting the true facts surrounding the loan when he was 
questioned about it. Heslop lied to his employer, which is good 
cause to terminate. O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F.Supp. 
656 (D. Utah 1990) (Summary judgment granted in favor of 
employer in wrongful discharge action, holding that after-
discovered evidence of employee's misrepresentations regarding 
her true age and past employment applications was an independent 
basis, as a matter of law, justifying termination). See also 
Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th 
Cir. 1989). An employer should have the discretion to 
discipline an employee who lies about a bad $260,000 loan 
without fear of liability for constructive discharge. Berube 
recognized "that due deference be paid to managerial discretion 
and normal employment decisions." 771 P.2d at 1045-46. 
POINT II. 
NEW TRIAL IS NECESSARY BECAUSE OF ADMISSION OF 
IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE. 
For the same reasons set forth in POINT I, supra, the 
relevant evidence was insufficient to support the jury's 
verdict, and the Bank was prejudiced by introduction of 
irrelevant evidence. This Court should, in the alternative to 
ordering entry of judgment for the Bank, remand for a new trial 
and order the inadmissibility of evidence regarding the accrual 
0 0 7 8 7 16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
problem and events related thereto, Timmons' hiring and salary, 
payments to Peat Marwick, and terminations of other employees. 
POINT III. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES BAR HESLOPfS CLAIM. 
Heslop1s brief does not address the specific language of 
Utah's statute of frauds, U.C.A. §25-5-4(1), which requires a 
writing for fl[e]very agreement that by its terms is not to be 
performed within one year from the making" thereof. 
There is a difference between a contract of "permanent" or 
"lifetime" employment and a contract for a specific number of 
years until retirement. Heslop claimed the latter, which by its 
terms is not to be performed within one year. 
POINT IV. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE PROPERLY EXCLUDED AS AN 
ITEM OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. 
Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), 
was an action for failure to pay a first-party insurance claim, 
not an employment case. The Supreme Court stated, fltUtah 
adheres to the well-established rule that attorney's fees 
generally cannot be recovered unless provided for by statute or 
by contract.1" Id. at 419. The court did hold that in the 
context of that specific case, attorney1s fees could be 
recovered as "an item of consequential damages flowing from the 
insurers1 breach of contract." Id. at 420. 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), 
another first-party insurance case stated consequential damages 
0 0 7 8 7 17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
are "those reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably 
foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made." 
Id. at 801 (emphasis added) Beck involved a specific insurance 
contract. In that context, a jury could presumably determine 
what was reasonably foreseeable. 
However, the Bank could not have reasonably foreseen 
attorney's fees as a consequential damage for breach of an 
implied contract it did not even think existed. Beck implicitly 
recognized this: "The foreseeability of any such damages will 
always hinge upon the nature and language of the contract and 
the reasonable expectations of the parties." Id. at 802 
(emphasis added) 
Berube said nothing about attorney's fees as consequential 
damages for breach of an implied-in-fact contract of employment. 
None of the post-Berube employment cases have stated attorney's 
fees are consequential damages. 
Moreover, Zions First Nat. Bank v. Nat. Am. Title Ins., 749 
P.2d 651 (Utah 1988), discussed an award of attorney's fees as 
consequential damages only in the context of "an implied 
contractual obligation to perform a first-party insurance 
contract fairly and in good faith", Id. at 657, which is 
inapposite to the instant case because Utah does not recognize 
such an implied obligation in employment cases. See POINT VI, 
supra. 
If Heslop's position were adopted, the contract exception to 
the general rule disallowing recovery of attorney's fees would 
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be unnecessary since attorney's fees could always be claimed as 
consequential damage of a contract breach. 
POINT V, 
HESLOP'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF AN 
IMPLIED IN-LAW COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED. 
In Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., supra (filed May 16, 
1991), this Court definitively held there is no implied-in-law 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment case. 
Although the Court recognized "every contract is subject to an 
implied covenant of good faith," it further held this general 
principle "cannot be construed to change an indefinite-term, at-
will employment contract into a contract that requires an 
employer to have good cause to justify a discharge." The Court 
concluded "the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it 
could find for the plaintiffs on the basis of a breach of an 
implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing." 161 
U.A.R. at 10. See also Caldwell v. Fordf Bacon and Davis, Utah, 
Inc., 111 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989). 
The law could not be more clear in Utah on this point and 
should not be changed. 
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POINT VI. 
HESLOP'S PUBLIC POLICY CLAIMS, SOUNDING IN TORT 
AND CONTRACT, WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on 
Heslop's Public Policy Claims Sounding in Tort 
In Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668 (Utah 
1989), plaintiff asserted a public policy tort claim associated 
with her alleged wrongful discharge. The trial court granted 
defendant's motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court reversed, but 
solely on the grounds that "the facts support a claim for 
contract damages under Berube." Id. at 670 (emphasis added). 
The Court further stated that in Berube, "we refused to 
recognize a variety of wrongful discharge actions sounding in 
tort." The tort public policy cause of action has therefore 
been rejected. 
In Brockmeyer v. Dunn and Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wise. 
1983), the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: 
We believe that reinstatement and back pay are 
the most appropriate remedies for public policy 
exception wrongful discharges since the primary 
concern in these actions is to make the wronged 
employee "whole." Therefore, we conclude that 
a contract action is most appropriate for 
wrongful discharges. 
Id. at 834. See also M.B.M. Co. Inc. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681 
(Ark. 1980); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 
549 (1974) holding the public policy exepetion does not create 
a t o r t claim. 
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That a majority of jurisdictions which recognize the public 
policy exception hold it creates a tort action is not 
determinitive. This Court refused to follow the majority rule 
which recognized a tort action for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Beck v, Farmers Ins. 
Exchange, supra, but rather held such a breach gives rise only 
to a contract claim. 
Heslop's request that the Court remand the case for further 
proceedings regarding the tort public policy theory, including 
punitive damages, (Heslop Brief at 78) could not possibly be 
done without a complete new trial. Moreover, the evidence of a 
public policy violation will not change whether it is a tort or 
a contract claim. As shown below, Heslop was unable to produce 
evidence sufficient to prove his claim. 
B. The Evidence Was Insufficient, as a Matter of Law, to 
Establish a Public Policy Claim 
The trial court1s dismissal of Heslop's contract public 
policy claim was "a directed verdict at the close of the 
evidence offered by an opponent.11 Rule 50(a), U.R.C.P. This 
Court will affirm if "no substantial evidence supported each 
element of a cause of action.11 Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 
supra. 
Berube indicated the public policy exception should be 
construed and applied narrowly. 771 P. 2d at 1043. Applying 
that standard, the trial court was correct in concluding there 
was no causal connection between Heslop's cooperation with the 
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Attorney General and the receipt of Heslopfs notes by the Bank's 
attorneys and Heslop1s ultimate termination. Browningfs refusal 
to accept Heslop1s offer to resign was an independent 
intervening act which cut off any such causal connection. The 
trial court also found no public policy violation was involved 
in the subpoenaing of Heslopfs notes in the Beutler case since 
the Bank never told Heslop to disobey the subpoena. That the 
content of the notes might have caused some problems is not a 
public policy issue. (Tr. 1149-51 attached as Addendum 2) 
One court explained the basis for a public policy claim as 
follows: 
Employees have redress if they lose their jobs 
"for asserting a legally guaranteed right 
(e.g., filing worker's compensation claim), for 
doing what the law requires, (e.g., serving on 
a jury) or for refusing to do that which the 
law forbids (e.g., committing perjury)." 
Yovino v. Fish, 539 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 1989). 
Heslop was never asked to, nor did he violate either of the 
statutes he asserts as a basis for a public policy claim—U.C.A. 
§7-1-318 (call reports) and U.C.A. §78-24-6 (subpoenas). If 
Heslop had been told to sign and file a false call report, had 
refused to do so, and had then been fired; or, if Heslop had 
been told not to produce his notes when they were subpoenaed by 
Beutler, had in fact produced his notes, and had then been 
fired, then he might have a public policy claim. Neither of 
those fact situations apply in this case. 
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Heslop1s objections to the accrual problem were made 
internally only. He never reported the accrual problem to 
regulatory authorities. House v. Carter-Wallace, lnc.f 232 N.J. 
Super. 41, 556 A.2d 353 (1989) affirmed summary judgment in 
favor of employer on House's public policy claim where House1s 
complaints regarding an alleged company violation of public 
policy were expressed in a corporate executive meeting, but 
never reported to any governmental or other outside authority. 
Accord cases cited in House, Id. at 357. Internal complaints 
give rise to a public policy claim only where the employee 
threatens to report the alleged violation to outside parties and 
is terminated before the complaint can be made. Id. In 
addition, House held there was no basis for inferring House was 
discharged to prevent him from reporting his views to 
authorities since three months passed between the date he 
learned about the problem and the date of discharge. 
In the instant case, Heslop knew about the accrual problem 
for more than one year from the date he resigned and had 
numerous opportunities to report to the regulatory authorities 
what he claims was a clear-cut violation of law, but never did, 
which failure forecloses his public policy claim. 
That Heslop1s internal behavior with respect to the accrual 
problem could be considered praiseworthy does not provide the 
basis for a public policy claim. See Geary v. United States 
Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974); Rinehimer v. Luzere City 
Com. College, 539 A.2d 1298 (Pa. Super. 1988) 
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Cases cited by Heslop are distinguishable. In Wagner v. 
City of Globe, 150 Ariz. 82, 722 P.2d 250 (1986) Wagner was 
terminated after he affirmatively reported an illegal arrest to 
the judge who was sentencing the arrestee. Heslop never 
reported his concerns to outside authorities. 
The facts do not support a public policy claim on the theory 
Heslop was terminted for refusing to acquiesce in illegal 
conduct. Even assuming illegality, Heslop did ultimately 
acquiesce in the course chosen to correct the accrual problem. 
Concern that he might have been subjected to a criminal charge 
is not causally connected to Heslop1s termination. 
In Delaney v. Taco Time, lnt'l.f 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 
(1984) defendant admitted it expressly discharged Delaney when 
he refused to sign a false and slanderous statement. No such 
facts exist in Heslopfs case. 
In McQuarty v. Bel Air Convelescent Home, Inc., 69 Or. App. 
107, 684 P. 2d 21 (1984) plaintiff was expressly fired on the 
spot after a heated argument with her superior during which 
plaintiff threatened to report his alleged patient abuse to the 
Health Division. This is totally different from Heslop's case. 
Heslop was not expressly fired even when he had disagreements 
with other officers, but instead his offers to resign were not 
accepted either in 1981 and January 1983. 
Johnson v. World Color Press, Inc., 147 111. App. 3rd 746, 
498 N.E.2d 575 (111. App. 1986) and Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 
433 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1988) were reversals of trial courts1 
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grants of defendants1 motions to dismiss for failure to state a 
cause of action, not directed verdicts at the conclusion of all 
plaintiffs1 evidence as occurred in the instant case. 
In Harlis v. First Nat'l. Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692 
(W.Va. 1982) plaintiff continued to work after a demotion, was 
subsequently reinstated, and thereafter expressly terminated. 
None of the cases cited by Heslop in Point H of his brief 
involved constructive discharge, but express terminations. This 
shows how tenuous any causal connection is between an alleged 
public policy violation and a constructive discharge. 
There is no basrs for a public policy claim in this case, 
either in tort or contract as a matter of fact or law, and the 
court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the same. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the judgment for Heslop and order 
entry of judgment for the Bank, or in the alternative order a 
new trial. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling on 
attorney's fees, summary judgment dismissing the tort public 
policy claim, and dismissal of the contract public policy claim. 
Respectfully submitted this /y / day of August, 1991. 
STRONG/6}HANNI 
Uwvt^v^/ 
Stuart H. Schultz 
Attorneys for The Bank of 
Utah 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
1. JNOV Hearing, (Supp. Tr. 28-29) 
2. Trial Court's Ruling Dismissing Public Policy Claim. 
(Tr. 1149-51) 
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have already been decided by the Jury. And the cases 
are very clear, and I have cited you a case in my 
memorandum that if there are disputed facts, then the 
JNOV is not appropriate. 
Now counsel has requested—or suggested that your 
Honor should have made an instruction to the jurors that 
the accrual problem, the investigations of the bank, and 
the circumstances surrounding the Timmons hiring did not 
relate to the constructive discharge issue, or the 
implied in fact contract issue. We submit, your Honor, 
that it would have been very inappropriate to make such 
a specific statement to the jurors, telling them which 
facts applied to specific issues in the case. Moreover, 
at trial, the Defendants had an opportunity to argue 
their version, or their view of the facts and of the 
issues in the case. They were not limited in any way in 
doing that. 
In chambers, prior to the trial, when you gave the 
Instructions to the jurors stating that the public 
policy claim had been dismissed from the case, you 
reviewed your statement with counsel. And after 
reviewing that statement, you said do you have any 
additions? Do you have any corrections? At that point 
in time, Mr. Hanni did not stand up and say, yes, I 
believe that we should also have a specific Instruction 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
\ 
to the jurors that these facts do not apply to those 
other issues in the case* 
THE COURT: He had already made that argument, 
hadn't he? 
MR. GRIFFIN: Pardon me? 
THE COURT: He had already made that argument 
to me, and I had rejected it. 
MR. GRIFFIN: Well, he had—that's true, you 
had rejected it on the public policy ground. But he had 
not made the argument that these facts, the accrual 
problem, the circumstances surrounding Timmons' hiring, 
and also the investigations, were irrelevant to the 
constructive discharge and the implied in fact contract 
issues. He had not made that argument. 
THE COURT: He raised the issue, there is no 
question about that. And I rejected it. Whether he 
made the argument or not, I guess is getting into 
semantics. 
MR. GRIFFIN: Okay. Anyway, he certainly had 
every opportunity to present his view of the facts and 
the issues on the case. 
I think what we need to do is look at Heslop's 
record at the bank. His record shows a very long term 
history of promotion. And implied in that promotion was 
support from Mr. Browning. And presumably the other 
29 
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strict language concerning how far they will go in 
recognizing the public policy exception to the at will 
rule. And they use the words that you have all brought 
to my attention, that the exception must involve 
substantial and important public policies, and we are to 
construe public policies narrowly, generally utilizing 
those based on prior legislative announcement or 
judicial decisions applicable to those principles, which 
are so substantial and fundamental that there can be 
virtually no question as to their promotion of the 
public good. 
I don't think this is a public policy case for the 
following reasons: The Plaintiff alleges several 
reasons why public policy should be brought into this 
case. The first is that he cooperated with the Attorney 
General, and this made one of the directors angry. 
Assuming that to be true, this happened a year and a 
half or so prior to Plaintiff's termination. There is 
no suggestion that that carried—at least no clear 
evidence that that anger carried on, and was significant 
beyond that. Everyone else cooperated with the Attorney 
General. 
The second suggestion is, and I don't know that this 
is in the pleadings, this is something that came out in 
trial, and it may be the most important suggestion of a 
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violation of public policy, and that's the fact that the 
bank's attorneys asked Mr. Heslop to turn over his notes 
so that they could claim that the notes were 
privileged. My understanding of what the rule of 
privilege is does not include that. I think that would 
be wrong. I think that's an attempt to improperly hide 
evidence from authorities. 
The Defendant didn't go along with that. The bank 
in response to that hired—excuse me. The Plaintiff 
didn't go along with that. The bank hired an attorney 
to represent the Plaintiff. 
MR. GRIFFIN: Well, he did submit his notes. 
THE COURT: The Attorney General's 
investigation was concluded without any serious incident 
to the bank. This also was remote in time to the time 
of Plaintiff's termination. 
I find it very significant that after both of those 
events, in response to the Plaintiff's reassignment, he 
went to Mr. Browning and offered to resign. And that 
resignation was not accepted. And he was in fact talked 
out of resigning. I think that's a significant 
intervening event which suggests to me that even though 
there might have been a public policy explanation for 
the termination, I think it would be a slim one if there 
is one. That that intervening event cut off any 
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suggestion that that was the cause for the ultimate 
termination. 
The only thing that remains is Mr. Heslop's 
acceptance of a subpoena, and the fact that he turned 
over his notes. There is no suggestion that anybody 
said he shouldn't respond to that subpoena, that he 
shouldn't turn his notes over in response to it. There 
is no evidence that that led to his termination in my 
opinion, at least not to the fact that he responded to 
the subpoena. But there may be some suggestion that the 
content of the notes themselves may have caused some 
anger on the part of management. And that would be 
understandable, I suppose, considering what the text of 
the notes was, since the notes were critical of both Mr. 
Timmons and Mr. Browning. But I don't think that is a 
public policy issue. That's simply the 
employee-employer relationship issue that you have in 
almost any termination case. And I don't think it has 
anything to do with the subpoena. The fact that the 
subpoena resulted in their being aware of the content of 
the notes doesn't bring it under the public policy 
exception in my opinion. 
For those reasons, and for reasons stated in the 
memoranda that I have read that would limit it to these 
brief cases, I think this is not a public policy case. 
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